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News :: Miscellaneous |
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Illinois National Guard Performance Under Question |
Current rating: 0 |
by ML
(No verified email address) |
06 Jun 2002
Modified: 07 Jun 2002 |
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Two recent reports indicate that the Illinois National Guard is suffering from a leadership crisis every bit as bad as the one that affects the Governor's office. |
Two recent reports indicate that the Illinois National Guard is suffering from a leadership crisis every bit as bad as the one that affects the Governor's office. Both reports are in regard to the circumstances surrounding the friendly fire incident that killed 4 Canadian soldiers during a training exercise in Afghanistan in April. The plane involved was from the Springfield, Illinois-based 183rd Fighter Squadron of the Illinois Air National Guard
The first is from the May 1, 2002 edition of DefenseWatch, a weekly newsletter published by Soldiers For The Truth: http://www.sftt.org/
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Friendly Fire, And a Broken National Guard
By J. David Galland
An extremely troubling pattern of deadly U.S. military mistakes this spring took a turn for the worse on Apr. 18 when an F-16 fighter accidentally bombed a group of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan, killing four and seriously injuring another eight men.
Given that the mishap occurred in a war zone, it was not surprising that the Pentagon and Central Command - after issuing condolences to the families of those killed - immediately regurgitated the party-line excuse: We are involved in an inherently dangerous business as members of a deployed military force. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on Apr. 22, said, "We all know that every conflict has its share of injuries to friendly forces, and they are truly painful when they occur."
While accurate, such ritual pronouncements evade the full and ugly truth: Nothing can excuse the fact that we are killing our own soldiers and allies. Now that the initial shock has worn off, and as American and Canadian investigators pursue the facts, it is imperative for all of us to ask why such a tragic accident could have happened.
We can start with several assumptions: Military leaders and trainers know full well that ground-based live fire exercises are inherently dangerous, especially in a region where actual combat operations are taking place. The perils are greatly compounded when there is a movement phase included in the exercise. It is also a safe assumption that the Canadian soldiers themselves knew the dangers of their training exercise and took great care to minimize risks to their soldiers as the exercise proceeded.
Then all of their cautious planning went up in smoke. Suddenly, two F-16s from the 183rd Fighter Wing of the Illinois Air National Guard came streaking in over the identified training area near Kandahar with a full load of live ordnance.
A reconstruction of the facts known to date, drawing on numerous press accounts and interviews I conducted with two soldiers who were there on the ground with the Canadian soldiers, confirms that the fatal accident could have - and should have - easily been prevented.
The pilot of the one F-16 that bombed the soldiers was flying in restricted training airspace directly over the established ground training area. A combat air controller twice instructed the pilot and his wingmate to change their flight course in order to move away from the troops on the ground. He failed to carry out that order.
Then, the pilot saw muzzle flashes on the ground from the Canadian small-arms exercise and mistakenly believed he was under attack. Ignoring the controller, the pilot still fired in what he apparently believed was self-defense. Seconds later, four young Canadian soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, were killed and eight were seriously wounded when a 500-pound laser-guided bomb from the F-16 fell on their position.
At this juncture, it is unknown what path the official investigations into the accident are taking - whether the focus will remain on the one F-16 pilot and his particular conduct that night, or whether the inquest will expand into a broader probe of how the Central Command is managing its ongoing air operations in Afghanistan.
From my corner of the foxhole, the Pentagon should widen the probe even farther to investigate the background of the Illinois Air National Guard whose unit, aircraft and pilot are at the center of the tragedy.
As examined in depth by DefenseWatch and other news media organizations this spring, it is very clear by now that many National Guard units are dysfunctional, outdated, under-trained, and under-qualified to carry out their peacetime and wartime missions.
Three weeks ago, Dr. David Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, was compelled to respond to Congress after questions were raised about serious allegations against several National Guard units. The allegations included drunkenness on National Guard bases, sexual harassment of female Guard members, misuse of taxpayer funds and thefts from life insurance payments. These offenses go far beyond youthful indiscretions.
The Illinois National Guard has been the focus of some of these accusations. In March 2000, a now-former Illinois National Guard official, Col. James Burgess, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for sexual misconduct after being caught in an FBI sting while trying to bribe Staff Sgt. Audrey Maher, also of the Illinois unit, to be less than forthcoming about his harassment. Burgess, who didn't know Maher was wearing an FBI listening device, also asked her to sleep with him. Seven former Illinois National Guard women are currently suing Burgess for a total of $16 million for sexual harassment.
Four years earlier, then-Illinois National Guard Adjutant General Maj. Gen. Richard Austin was accused by the Pentagon for drunkenness in front of his soldiers and displaying "conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman" after he drove a jeep on base in a "drunken and reckless manner" with soldiers aboard.
Within days of the Apr. 18 accident, Maj. Gen. David Harris, the present head of the Illinois National Guard, joined the chorus of U.S. military officials expressing his sorrow over the bombing accident, while carefully avoiding any possible admission that poor training or leadership may have played a role leading up to the tragedy: "The men and women from the 183rd Fighter Wing are highly trained professionals, there is always some risk in the missions that military personnel perform and the weapons they operate."
I don't buy it. As in any organization, military performance is a direct result of leadership effectiveness.
It will take a comprehensive, detailed investigation to confirm whether or not there was any direct connection between leadership failures at the Illinois National Guard and the accident in Afghanistan. But any probe that from the outset ignores or downplays even the possibility of such a connection would do a grave disservice both to the slain Canadians and to the vast majority of honest, hard-working National Guard personnel who are struggling in a troubled institution.
It is with regret, admiration and sadness that we remember our fallen Canadian comrades. Pvt. Nathan Smith, Pvt. Richard Green, Cpl. Ainsworth Dyer and Sgt. Marc Leger. But the only way we can truly honor them is to use this tragic accident as a springboard for a no-holds-barred investigation into the chronic shortcomings of the National Guard.
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The second article was apparently published in The Vancouver (Canada) Sun (http://www.canada.com/vancouver/vancouversun/) and questions are being raised about over-worked pilots as a possible contributing cause to the incident.
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From the Vancouver Sun:
Pilots from the U.S. fighter squadron that mistakenly bombed Canadian troops in Afghanistan had told their commanders shortly before the fatal accident that they were exhausted and needed more rest between missions. The informal meeting between pilots of the 183rd Fighter Wing and their commanding officers was convened after the unit misidentified a bombing target during a previous mission over Iraq. The 183rd, an Air National Guard unit currently stationed in Kuwait, was flying patrol missions in the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq as well as sorties over Afghanistan.
In the meeting, held in the week before Canadian soldiers were shelled by American bombs in Afghanistan, at least one F-16 pilot complained that requirements for crew rest were not being observed and that many of the pilots were overtired. The pilot was told, however, that further questions about crew rest would not be looked on favorably by the wing command. Instead, pilots were advised to speak to a flight surgeon about so-called "go/no pills" -- amphetamines used to help stay awake on long missions, and sedatives to help sleep.
Then, on April 17, a fighter from the 183rd flying a patrol mission accidentally bombed Canadian troops conducting a live-fire exercise south of Kandahar. Four soldiers from the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry were killed and eight injured.
There is no evidence that the pilots involved in either bombing had taken any of the stimulants offered. But the use of amphetamines was common among American fighter pilots in the Gulf War, according to journalist Rick Atkinson, author of Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. "There was concern in some squadrons that the pilots were becoming psychologically, if not physically, addicted to the pills," he told PBS's Frontline last year. Atkinson estimates two-thirds of all pilots in Desert Storm used dexedrine at least once. "Some commanders became concerned enough to ban the flight surgeons from issuing further 'go' pills. It became remarkably divisive within some squadrons."
Copyright 2002 The Vancouver Sun |
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MURDERS R U.S. |
by LARRY
(No verified email address) |
Current rating: 0
07 Jun 2002
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Those nazis are nuts for real !!! well its just a matter of time before those doped up fascists are fling sorties over the u.s.it will happen just watch |
