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News :: Elections & Legislation
Election machine equipment recommendation committee meeting report Current rating: 0
10 Oct 2004

I am the delegate from the Prairiegreens (the local Green Party chapter) to the Champaign County Election Equipment Recommendation Committee. This unelected committee features people from a variety of political groups and civic organizations in Champaign county. We will make a recommendation to the County Board so they will know what voting machines to purchase. Champaign county will use punch cards in November 2004 but we will switch to electronic voting machines for the following elections.

Champaign County Election Equipment Recommendation Committee report
J.B. Nicholson-Owens jbn@forestfield.org

First posted on 2004-09-06 to the Prairiegreens mailing list.

I am the delegate from the Prairiegreens (the local Green Party chapter) to the Champaign County Election Equipment Recommendation Committee. This unelected committee features people from a variety of political groups and civic organizations in Champaign county. We will make a recommendation to the County Board so they will know what voting machines to purchase. Champaign county will use punch cards in November 2004 but we will switch to electronic voting machines for the following elections.

The elected County Board has the real power in this relationship; they will ultimately decide what machines to buy. It is my hope that the Election Equipment Recommendation Committee will make a good recommendation and that the County Board will follow it.

This Committee meets monthly (with three exceptions: October and November to make time for voting preparations, and one month in the summer to accommodate people's vacations).

What follows is my latest report to the Prairiegreens about the Committee's latest meeting.


Executive summary

  • Consolidation of polling places is underway. Schools pose an interesting dilemma.
  • RFPs are not yet available for us to review.
  • Hart InterCivic's "eSlate" demo was a bust.

Introduction

On August 31, 2004 I attended another meeting of the committee which will recommend voting machine equipment to the County Board. We have been considering machines presented to us by "approved vendors" — a short list of vendors that meet state approval criterion which we had no power to set. At the meeting we heard from a surprise candidate, a corporation we had no idea would be submitting for Illinois' approval — Hart InterCivic. We also received a preliminary report on polling place consolidation.

Requests for Proposals

We had planned on receiving copies of Request for Proposals (RFPs). RFPs are a summary of what we want the machine to do and they specify some contract highlights on how the machine should work. They are not contracts, but they provide a useful guideline to illustrate what we're looking for. RFPs come from Mark Shelden's office, go through some kind of group editing and revision by the recommendation committee, and then be sent to the various vendors who will ostensibly make sure that their proposals meet our criteria.

Electronic Voting Machine Installation and Budget

The machines will be installed by March 2006 which complies with the "Help America Vote Act" (HAVA). The budget for the machine purchases is $400,000 to $500,000. Polling place consolidation (more on this below) will help save about $250,000 (meaning that we can't afford to place electronic HAVA-compliant machines in extant polling places). This means spending about $5,000 to $6,000 per polling place.

Polling Place Consolidation

Three members of the committee, Guy Hampel, Margaret Olsen, and Mark Shelden worked on consolidating precincts. The goal of polling place consolidation was to reduce the number of polling places so that we could afford to fill them with electronic voting machines that meet federal requirements. HAVA requires that the first federal election after January 1, 2006 must use HAVA-compliant voting equipment. If we are to meet this requirement and come within budget, we need to reduce the number of machines we buy and that means reducing the number of polling places in Champaign county.

The number of election judges won't change. In each polling place we will try to use one vote-counting machine, one direct recording machine (for the blind), and multiple optical scan paper ballot machines (for everyone else). Blind users are welcome to not use the direct recording machine if they wish. I recommend all voters use only voter-verified paper ballot machines. We'll buy 88 machines total after consolidating districts.

Polling place conundrum

School gymnasiums are a double-edged sword when it comes to deciding where the polling places will be. They provide an attractive facility because of their size, electrification, wheelchair-accessibility, location, and parking, but they present a dilemma for sex offenders. Sex offenders can't go within a certain distance of the school and yet that's where the polling place may be. Options for solving this include not having a school serve as a polling place (this requires a viable alternative to be a valid option), possibly having someone supervise them voting (but not entering the booth because anonymous voting is important) somehow inconspicuously walking them into and out of the area where they could normally not go (is this even possible?), taking the voting machine to the sex offender instead of taking the sex offender to the polling place (which requires non-disclosure agreements to be done if the sex offender's voting location is not public information).

Hart InterCivic

To our surprise, there was a latecomer submission in voting machines. At previous meetings, Hart InterCivic was not one of the corporations providing demonstrations of their machines. We heard from Diebold (via Fidlar, their approved vendor for Illinois) and ES&S (Election Systems and Software). Now we'll hear from another big name in the voting machine industry. Hart InterCivic is currently seeking Illinois state certification.

The Hart InterCivic "eSlate" system consists of two machines which interact via a large cable. The first machine is called a "Judge" machine which costs $2500. The second machine is the eSlate which (coupled with the other necessary parts like booth wall hardware, a paper trail printer, and a battery) costs $2700.

The election judge uses the Judge machine to set up the eSlate machine in the booth. The Judge machine generates a 4-digit numeric code which is printed on a slip of paper. The election judge hands this paper to the voter. The voter has a predetermined number of minutes to find an unused booth and input the 4-digit code correctly. The 4-digit code unlocks the eSlate machine and loads in the proper ballot style. Then, and only then, can the voter navigate through the ballot with the eSlate machine. Complicated enough?

The eSlate system poses multiple problems:

  • It appears to be a DRE (Direct Recording Equipment) without a voter-verified paper ballot. Lawrence Leach, the Hart InterCivic rep who demoed the machine for us, said that they could add a sealed log printer which would let the user see a hardcopy that echoes their vote but can never be touched by the voter. Like my reaction to Diebold, who promised a hardcopy add-on, I say if it's not demoed for us it doesn't count.
  • The input mechanism is a wheel you spin around like a paddle on a video game (think "Tempest") or a jog/shuttle dial on some video equipment. Even I had a problem navigating with this, I can't imagine someone who is computer illiterate using this in a reasonable time frame on a busy voting day.
  • The Judge machine could easily be mistaken for a vote monitor -- it would be impossible to convince some voters that the election judges weren't monitoring and/or altering their vote, assuming we could verify this wasn't true.
  • Even if the hardcopy is accurate and voter-verified, if we're relying on the electronic count we subject ourselves to the same problem as described at the top of http://www.blackboxvoting.org/ which is Bev Harris' website. This problem can only be fixed with a hand count of voter-verified paper ballots (which I think we should have regardless of what machines we get -- anyone who can't wait a few days for the results simply needs to be more patient).

Alternative inputs for the eSlate

The eSlate can also use a pair of "jelly switches" which are a simple pair of colored large buttons. You press one to navigate the ballot by moving the cursor one way through the choices and the other jelly switch to select a choice. The controls are simple but their lack of expressive capability makes them slow to use. The hassle involved discourages voters from voting for write-in candidates: Imagine typing a write-in candidate's name with a virtual keyboard where your only controls are "next letter" and "select letter". Now imagine if a candidate with a long name like "Blagojevich" was a write-in candidate. The eSlate can work with a sip and puff interface which paraplegics can use. Hart InterCivic is working on a carrying device to allow curbside voting with the eSlate.

The ballots are all stored electronically and so, like any DRE without a voter-verified paper ballot, they are completely untrustworthy. It appears that the votes are stored in a PCMCIA card (those of you who have laptop computers might be able to mount the storage device and load the votes or store something else on the card).

Hart InterCivic owns all the code to the system, and this would ordinarily be a significant first step in negotiating for a free software license to the voting machines source code. But there are many show-stopper flaws, most notably a lack of demonstrated voter-verified printed ballot, so I don't think it's wise to purchase these machines.

By now I've taken more than enough of your time on this matter. If you would like more information on the eSlate system, the demo I saw, or any other aspect of our meetings, please feel free to write me.


Copyright 2004 J.B. Nicholson-Owens

Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire article is permitted in any medium without royalty provided this notice is preserved.


Copyright by the author. All rights reserved.
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One additional link.
Current rating: 0
11 Oct 2004

I forgot to link to my article on why we need free software voting machines. See http://www.counterpunch.org/baker08192004.html for that article.

Re: Election machine equipment recommendation committee meeting report
Current rating: 0
23 Oct 2004
Thanks for your careful report. I hope the other committee members agree with you that the eSlate
system as described is unsuitable.

Do you have an idea how much larger the
new voting precincts will be, or how many there'll be?
You mention 88 machines but not how many fewer
polling places they'd be distributed across.

I'm very glad to hear that most of the voting machines
will be of the optical-scan type. I used to be an
election judge in Minneapolis, MN, where all
voting was done on such machines. They seemed to
work well, there were good procedures to follow
when the machines failed, and manual counting was
obviously possible. Voters fed their own ballots directly to the scanner, and got (embarrassingly public) feedback of overvotes, in which case they
could either ask a judge to (publicly) accept the
rest of the ballot anyway, or could trade for a blank
ballot and start over. Most did, though a few would
leave in frustration.

The counting machines were not networked; the night's totals were printed on several rolls of paper, of which one was posted at the polling place, others were
carried away by party representatives, and others
were carried to the city headquarters along with the
electronic ("PROM") copy and the sealed box of
paper ballots. Submissions also included a beginning-of-day paper tape, checked by the
judges, verifying that initial counts were zero and
that the electronic list of offices matched those on the
paper ballots.

I trust that the election-headquarters tabulating
machines were not (and in Champaign
County also will not be) accessible by network or telephone, avoiding the very real risk of wide-scale
remote tampering pointed out in e.g.
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78

[hmm, maybe this isn't such a quick comment any more...]