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News :: Iraq
Unravelling the Known Unknowns: Why no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found in Iraq Current rating: 0
31 Jan 2004

On the eve of the publication of the Hutton inquiry report into the circumstances surrounding the death of UK government scientist David Kelly, this BASIC Report provides a timely update and summary of the evidence that has been accumulated by the US inspectors in Iraq and from other public sources over the past eight months. The evidence confirms that US and British forces were led into battle on spurious grounds.

The report also attempts to shed light on the reasons for this: why did the US and UK governments exaggerate? Or did they themselves misunderstand what went before? Were they themselves misled by available pre-war intelligence on Iraq's WMD capability?

BASIC SPECIAL REPORT

BASIC Special Report 2004.1 · January 2004

Unravelling the Known Unknowns:
Why no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found in Iraq

By David Isenberg and Ian Davis

For an HTML version of this report go to: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004WMD.htm.

For a PDF version of this report go to: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004WMD.pdf.

Contents

Executive Summary

Introduction

Part I: Iraq's WMD Capability

Part II: The Ambiguities and Flaws in US and British Pre-War Intelligence Analysis on Iraq's WMD Capability

Part III: Conclusions and Recommendations

Appendix 1: Lest We Forget: US Claims of Iraqi WMD Capabilities

Endnotes

The British American Security Information Council

The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) is an independent research organization that analyzes international security issues. BASIC works to promote awareness of security issues among the public, policy makers and the media in order to foster informed debate on both sides of the Atlantic.

BASIC in the U.K. is a registered charity no. 1001081
BASIC in the U.S. is a non-profit organization constituted under
Section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service Code

David Isenberg, Senior Analyst

David Isenberg joined BASIC's Washington office in November 2002. He has a wide background in arms control and national security issues, and brings close to 20 years of experience in this field, including three years as a member of DynMeridian's Arms Control & Threat Reduction Division, and nine years as Senior Analyst at the Center for Defense Information.

Ian Davis, Director
Dr. Ian Davis is Executive Director of BASIC and has a rich background in government, academia, and the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector. He received both his Ph.D. and B.A. in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford. He was formerly Program Manager at Saferworld before being appointed as the new Executive Director of BASIC in October 2001. He has published widely on British defense and foreign policy, European security, the international arms trade, arms export controls, small arms and light weapons and defense diversification.

Support

This publication was made possible through funding from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.

Unravelling the Known Unknowns:
Why no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found in Iraq

By David Isenberg and Ian Davis

Published by the British American Security Information Council
BASIC Special Report 2004.1 - January 2004

© BASIC, 2004

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without permission in writing from the copyright holder(s).

The views presented here do not necessarily reflect the views of BASIC, its staff or Council members.

See also:
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004WMD.htm

Copyright by the author. All rights reserved.
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UK & DC: GROWING DEMANDS FOR INQUIRIES OVER WMD FIASCO...
Current rating: 0
31 Jan 2004
Tony Blair and the Bush administration were facing growing demands yesterday for independent inquiries into the intelligence debacle over Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction.

The pressure intensified this week with the admission by David Kay, the outgoing chief weapons inspector, that "we were almost all wrong" in the belief that Saddam Hussein possessed chemical and biological weapons.

Downing Street brushed aside calls for an independent inquiry into the approach to the war in Iraq. But the clamor for answers mounted yesterday when the Conservatives joined anti-war MPs in demanding an investigation.

Mr Blair is likely to face renewed questioning from MPs when he faces members of the Commons Liaison Committee on Tuesday, while the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee was said to be planning to examine the intelligence used in the run-up to war.

Robin Cook, the former foreign secretary, appealed to Mr Blair to admit the intelligence was "wildly wrong". He said: "Now that even the White House has admitted they may have got it wrong, it's getting embarrassing to watch our government still trying to deny reality. The game is up."

In the United States, even some influential Republicans in Congress say only a full-scale and non-partisan investigation can provide the answers. For the White House such an investigation might open an election year Pandora's box, and for the moment it appears to be stalling, a tactic that may be helped in the short term by the apparent rejection of a similar exercise in Britain by Mr Blair.

Condoleezza Rice, Mr Bush's National Security Adviser, said this week that, although the President was determined to get to the bottom of the matter, the Iraq Survey Group, which Mr Kay used to head, must finish its work first.

Michael Ancram, the shadow Foreign Secretary, said: "Condoleezza Rice's comments show once again that a full independent inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the lead-up to the Iraq war and its aftermath is absolutely essential."

"I want to know the facts," Mr Bush told reporters yesterday, refusing to commit to an independent inquiry. But such delay may no longer be possible.

In a blistering criticism of the CIA, Pat Roberts, the Kansas Republican who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee, described events as "a runaway train". The result was "a world-class intelligence failure".

The case for an outside independent investigation is strengthened by the likelihood of deadlock on the Senate and House intelligence panels which are due to finalize draft reports on the WMD fiasco. Mr Roberts left little doubt that his report would be highly critical.

Even so the Democratic minorities on the two committees are likely to issue dissenting reports, claiming the White House deliberately exaggerated claims about Saddam's weapons.


© 2004 Independent Digital (UK) Ltd
http://news.independent.co.uk
'The Public Must Look to What is Missing From the Report'
Current rating: 0
31 Jan 2004
Tony Blair's government is heralding the Hutton report as a victory, since it absolves it of any wrongdoing regarding the "sexing up" of intelligence about the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

The Hutton report was released at the same time as the former head of the Iraq Survey Group, David Kay, testified before the US Congress that there appear to be no WMD in Iraq, and that the intelligence was "all wrong". Given this, the Hutton findings have taken on an almost Alice in Wonderland aura. By focusing on a single news story broadcast by the BBC, Hutton has created a political smokescreen behind which Blair is seeking to distract the British public from the harsh reality that his government went to war based on unsustained allegations that have yet to be backed up with a single piece of substantive fact. Lord Hutton was in a position to expose this; he chose not to. It is left to the public, therefore, to carefully examine his report, looking not for what it contains but for what is missing.

A review of testimony submitted to the inquiry elicits a single reference to Operation Rockingham, a secretive intelligence activity buried inside the Defense Intelligence Staff, which dealt with Iraqi WMD and activities of the UN special commission (UNSCOM). This acknowledged that Rockingham managed the interaction between David Kelly, the weapons expert whose suicide led to the Hutton inquiry, and the UN. But Lord Hutton dug no further into this. If he had, some interesting insight would have been provided on several issues of concern, including the possibility of the "shaping" of UN intelligence data by Rockingham to serve the policy objectives of its masters in the Foreign Office and the joint intelligence committee.

Dr Kelly became Rockingham's go-to person for translating the often confusing data that came out of UNSCOM into concise reporting that could be forwarded to analysts in the British intelligence community, as well as to political decision-makers. Rockingham was in a position to know that, increasingly, the facts emerging from inside Iraq supported Baghdad's contention that there was no longer a biological weapons program in Iraq, or any hidden biological weapons or agents.

But this data received little or no attention inside Rockingham. Dr Kelly was not only an active participant in the investigations in Iraq, but also a key player in shaping the findings to the British government. He was also one of the key behind-the-scenes advocates of the government position. For some time, the government had allowed him unfettered access to the press, where he spoke, often on the record, about his work with UNSCOM

Any probing of Rockingham by Lord Hutton would have exposed it for what it had become - a big player in the shaping of information regarding Iraq's WMD inside the government and, through its media connections, in shaping public opinion as well.

Given Rockingham's penetration of UNSCOM at virtually every level, there existed a seamless flow of data from Iraq, through New York, to London, carefully shaped from beginning to end by people working not for the UN security council, but for the British government. Iraq's guilt, preordained by the government, became a self-fulfilling prophesy that only collapsed when occupied Iraq failed to disgorge that which Rockingham, and the rest of the UK intelligence community, had said must exist.


· Scott Ritter was formerly chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq

© Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004
http://www.guardian.co.uk/