|
Comment on this article |
Email this Article
|
|
News :: Miscellaneous |
|
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Why It Is Important |
Current rating: 0 |
by Mike Lehman
Email: mlehman (nospam) students.uiuc.edu (unverified!) |
06 May 2001
|
|
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is fruit of a decades long search for an agreement to end the development of new nuclear weapons and to prevent the proliferation of them to countries that don’t possess them. The CTBT has been signed by the five acknowledged nuclear states and was passed in the United Nations General Assembly by a vote of 158-3. |
The U.S. has abided by the terms of the treaty by continuing a moratorium on nuclear testing that began under President Bush in 1992. Yet the U.S. Senate opposed ratification of the CTBT in a 1999 vote that was undermined by President Clinton’s failure to aggressively support his administration’s stated position in favor of the CTBT, combined with his personal political difficulties.
Critics of the CTBT charge that verification of the treaty cannot be done with 100% certainty. They feel that other nations may not abide by the CTBT by testing nuclear weapons underground that would be so small that they would not be detectable by seismic sensors. The other primary concern of opponents is the reliability of existing nuclear weapons. In the past, the continuos development of new weapons systems because of the Cold War arms race ensured that new types of weapons would replace old types so quickly that there was no need for concern about long-term reliability of weapons. Since the U.S. deterrent would rest solely on existing weapons designs, opponents feel that actual explosion of weapons on a periodic basis may be needed to ensure that they can still be relied on if they were ever needed.
Proponents of the CTBT argue that both of these concerns are unfounded. Verification of arms control treaties is an extension of U.S. intelligence efforts that have a long history of being able to accurately analyze and resolve data that reveal nuclear testing on a world-wide basis. Implementation of the CTBT would significantly expand the ability of the present U.S. monitoring system run by the Air Force Technical Applications Center. For incidents that indicate possible violations of the CTBT, there are provisions that allow on-site inspections, something which is not possible with the current system. The issue of reliability of stockpile weapons requires further research to resolve all the issues involved. A Stockpile Stewardship Program has been developed by the Department of Energy in cooperation with the Department of Defense to periodically examine weapons in the inventory for any problems that may develop with storage and to certify weapon reliability and safety. This program will also preserve the capacity of the U.S. to maintain and remanufacture weapons components as needed.
We are at an historic moment on this planet, in which the arms race has slowed and consensus has built about the dangers that nuclear weapons pose to all people, whether friend or foe. The prevention of the further spread of weapons is in the interest of the U.S. and a halt to testing is the surest way to prevent anyone who might construct such weapons from being able to rely on them. The CTBT leaves the U.S. in a predominant position of military power, since it requires no reduction in current stockpiles of reliable weapons. The CTBT is a historic pact between nuclear haves and have-nots. If the CTBT unravels because the U.S. refuses to ratify it, the threat of nuclear war will expand, rather than decrease, as time goes by. The Senate should thoughtfully reconsider the CTBT in a timely manner and vote to ratify it at the earliest opportunity.
References:
http://www.aip.org/pt/cont9803.html
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage/ctbt_report.html#report |
