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News :: Miscellaneous |
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Matching the Rhetoric at the Bush-Putin Summit |
Current rating: 0 |
by Kenneth N. Luongo
(No verified email address) |
21 Nov 2001
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A Real Security Improvement Is Possible At A Bargain Price
Will Bush Take His Ideological Blinders Off For Long Enough To Fund It? |
WASHINGTON -- Whether or not Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist network have actually acquired nuclear weapons or materials, one fact remains crystal clear: The insecure stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and related materials, technologies, and expertise that exist in Russia and the former Soviet states still present an unacceptable potential pathway for terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
Post-September 11, one would think that countries around the world would not hesitate to accelerate efforts to secure these deadly stockpiles as soon as possible. And, in fact, since the Pentagon and World Trade Center attacks, numerous leaders and institutions around the world have all underscored the need to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong hands. Most recently, at their summit meeting, Presidents Bush and Putin affirmed this goal as their "highest priority."
But the rhetoric not been matched by action to address these new realities. There have been no new U.S. or Russian commitments, resources, or political mechanisms that would accelerate U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation. Regrettably, no substantial injection of resources – either monetary or political – appears to be forthcoming. In fact, the White House initially cut funding for this agenda by $100 million. And now National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice asserts that the cuts never happened.
Also, consider the $40 billion emergency supplemental funding package that was approved by Congress following the September 11 attacks to help with disaster recovery efforts, beef-up homeland defense efforts, and expand other anti-terrorism activities. This is an enormous amount of money, yet not a single dollar was requested by the President to enhance WMD security in the former Soviet Union. Even more startling was the promise of a veto by President Bush if congressional leaders – both Republicans and Democrats – move ahead with their plans to increase the size of the supplemental package in order to accommodate emergency funding for nonproliferation, among other things.
However, based on authoritative reports and analyses, the three areas of highest priority – expanding security of Russian nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials, improving Russian and FSU border security and export controls, and facilitating the downsizing of the Russian nuclear weapons complex and preventing brain-drain – could utilize an average of roughly $500 million this year to greatly advance their activities.
Funding at this level would represent just over 1% of the total supplemental package – by no means an excessive amount, and a small price to pay for greater security.
Providing increased financial resources is only half of the equation, however, when it comes to improving nuclear security in Russia. The other component is political capital, and both Bush and Putin need to expend some of it if nonproliferation cooperation is to improve significantly in the wake of September 11. Both Presidents are paying lip service to this agenda but the rhetoric is empty.
Over the past several years, serious problems have emerged in the implementation of many cooperative nuclear security programs. The absence of adequate high-level political intervention has allowed these problems to fester, causing serious disputes to erupt between the U.S. and Russian implementing agencies on a number of projects. An example of this tension is disagreement on the issue of access by U.S. officials to sensitive Russian nuclear facilities where security assistance is being rendered, to ensure that funds are being spent appropriately.
In recent years, the United States has hardened its demands for more extensive access to sensitive Russian sites. Russia has resisted, over concerns that U.S. intrusion could compromise classified information, and because Russian specialists have less access to U.S. nuclear facilities than U.S. representatives do to Russia’s. This tug-of-war has thrown the brakes on implementation of several high-priority nuclear weapons and material security efforts, and it has fed an undercurrent of mistrust and resentment on both sides.
Instructions from the White House and the Kremlin to their respective bureaucracies to clear away the stumbling blocks that have clogged this agenda could provide a needed impetus to this work a decade after it began, and hopefully allow it to be substantially completed on a much more rapid schedule then is now projected.
Over the past decade, the cooperative U.S.-Russian WMD security programs have built a long list of achievements. However, much more needs to be done if both nations are to reduce and eliminate the threat of terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.
Kenneth N. Luongo, analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus, is executive director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. He was formerly senior policy advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation Policy, director of the Energy Department’s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and director of DOE’s Russia and Newly Independent States Nuclear Material Security Task Force.
Copyright 2001
Global Beat Syndicate, 418 Lafayette Street, Suite 554, New York, NY 10003 |
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