|
Comment on this article |
Email this Article
|
|
Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means? |
Current rating: 0 |
by af/cerrv via scott e
Email: scottisimo (nospam) hotmail.com (verified) |
25 Dec 2004
|
TITLE: Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?
AUTHOR: International Crisis Group
CATEGORY: Eastern Region
DATE: 12/21/2004
SOURCE: ICG. Africa report #88
SUMMARY & COMMENT: Despite apparent progress indicated by the
declaration in October of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG),
Somalia’s peace process risks collapse, leaving the country a dangerous
failed state, unless a genuine government of national unity can emerge.
The TFG should have been reason to celebrate: after nearly fifteen years
of statelessness and civil strife and two years of tortuous peace
negotiations in Kenya, Somalia seemed to be emerging from its crisis.
But the peace process has since gone largely downhill. The country is
still controlled by a patchwork of factions, land remains occupied, and
violations of the ceasefire and UN arms embargo are rife. The TFG has to
tackle these issues, while earning the legitimacy to do so effectively.
Otherwise the peace process will stall, and Somalia will likely return
to all-out violence. |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The declaration, in Kenya, of a
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in October 2004 was heralded as a
breakthrough in Somalia’s protracted crisis of statelessness and civil
strife. But the peace process has gone largely downhill since then. The
Transitional Federal Parliament’s choice for interim president, Colonel
Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, is divisive and controversial. To many Somalis,
his election represents not a step toward peace but continuation of the
war by other means. The status of the peace process is grim but not
altogether hopeless. Yusuf and his partners need to use their political
advantage to form a genuine government of national unity, rather than
attempt to impose their own agenda on the transition. The international
community needs to make clear that only if this happens will the TFG get
the recognition and support it desperately seeks. The probable
alternative is resumption of Somali’s conflict through all-too-familiar
means The archetypal Somali warlord, Yusuf’s opposition to the now
defunct Transitional National Government (TNG), his advocacy of a
federal structure for Somalia and his close ties with neighbouring
Ethiopia, together place him firmly in one camp in Somalia’s
long-running conflict. In order to cement his victory, Yusuf called for
deployment to Somalia of a 20,000-strong multinational military force.
His choice for prime minister and the composition of the first TFG
cabinet confirmed his pursuit of a narrow political agenda, provoking a
parliamentary revolt, a no-confidence vote (ostensibly for other
reasons) and dissolution of the government. The 15 December deadline for
the return of the TFG to Somalia, set by the member states of the
regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), expired with
it still in Nairobi, citing insecurity in its homeland. Divisions
between regional powers and the wider international community have
impeded the emergence of a common orientation toward the interim Somali
leadership. The challenges ahead are formidable. The TFG must
reconstitute itself and return to Somalia; the decision whether to go to
Mogadishu or identify an interim seat of government is charged with
political significance and may well have repercussions on the security
situation in parts of the country as well. Restoration of a secure
environment is a top priority: the AU favours a modest monitoring and
observer force, rather than the big battalions envisioned by Yusuf; but
no deployment is likely until a formal, measurable ceasefire instrument
has been drawn up and the deployment of foreign troops has been
authorised by the transitional parliament. The TFG was born impoverished
and quickly needs to secure sources of revenue. Few governments are
willing -- or able -- to provide direct budgetary support, so the TFG
will be obliged to tap domestic sources such as ports and airports.
Although most faction leaders have agreed in principle that these should
be turned over to the control of the interim government, their
commitment is questionable, and no agreement has been reached as to how
or when revenues will be shared and managed. If the TFG attempts to gain
control of economic infrastructure by force or subterfuge, it risks
serious violence. Over the longer term, the elaboration of a federal
structure and the development of a permanent constitution are delicate
issues fraught with risk. Despite agreement on a Transitional Federal
Charter, many (if not most) Somalis will need to be persuaded of
federalism’s merits. As yet, there has been little substantive
discussion on the form it might take. The demarcation of new
administrative boundaries, control of revenue, and the future of
existing institutions such as regional "governors" or, where they exist,
parliaments, are just some of the issues that are likely to be fiercely
contested. The question of Somali unity is still pending and has been
complicated by Yusuf’s election. The self-declared Republic of
Somaliland associates Yusuf, as the former president of Puntland, with
Puntland’s claims to the regions of eastern Sanaag and Sool, which lie
within the colonial boundaries inherited by Somaliland. Within two weeks
of his election, unusually bloody clashes between Somaliland and
Puntland forces in the Sool region had left over 100 people dead.
Violence has since subsided, and both sides are employing various
channels of communication to defuse the tension, but Somaliland’s claims
to independent statehood have yet to be addressed by the international
community and will continue to be a source of friction throughout the
transitional period. RECOMMENDATIONS To the Leadership of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG): 1. Constitute a new, smaller and
cost-effective cabinet that is a genuine government of national unity.
2. Prepare for parliamentary debate and approval of a comprehensive and
measurable ceasefire plan and proposal for deployment of an AU
monitoring and observer force. 3. Enter negotiations with those groups
currently in control of economic infrastructure, including on the terms
of revenue sharing and management. 4. Initiate substantive dialogue and
debate within the Transitional Federal Parliament and beyond on
federalism options. To the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP): 5.
Recommit to the cessation of hostilities implicit in the Transitional
Federal Charter and co-operate with the TFG in designing comprehensive,
verifiable ceasefire arrangements. 6. Pass legislation authorising the
deployment of an AU peace support mission, providing clear parameters
for its mandate and duration. 7. Establish parliamentary committees as
soon as possible to exercise oversight of the TFG and to help enforce
the principle of parliamentary supremacy. To the African Union (AU): 8.
Continue planning for deploying a modest monitoring, observation and
protection force in Somalia, including some training for Somali security
forces. 9. Insist that the preconditions of a measurable ceasefire plan
and parliamentary approval for the force be in place prior to any
deployment. 10. Exclude troops from "Front-line States" (Djibouti,
Ethiopia and Kenya) from the AU force, or at least from any role that
could expose them to combat operations. 11. Dispatch a fact-finding
mission to Somaliland, take the leadership’s claim to independent
statehood under formal consideration, and in this context, also explore
options for resolution of the border dispute with Puntland. To the
United Nations Secretariat and Specialised Agencies: 12. Augment UN
representation to the level of Special Representative of the Secretary-
General and appoint a diplomat from a disinterested and impartial nation
to the post. 13. Plan for expansion of the UN Political Office for
Somalia to a fully-fledged Peace Building Office on condition that the
TFG returns to Somalia and demonstrates a reasonable degree of
legitimacy and authority. 14. Continue decentralised programming of aid
resources in Somalia independently of the TFG (respecting the
Coordination and Monitoring Committee’s guidelines), while working
toward gradually closer collaboration and coordination with TFG
ministries and agencies. 15. Commit resources for capacity building of
TFG institutions. 16. Expand the membership and resources of the
existing UN Monitoring Group and recommend to the Security Council
concrete actions against individuals and groups identified by the Group
as being in violation of the embargo or otherwise obstructing the peace
process. To the EU, U.S., AU, IGAD, Arab League and Other Members of the
Coordination and Monitoring Committee: 17. Formalise the draft
Declaration of Principles together with jointly agreed monitoring
criteria and mechanisms. 18. Engage Front-line states to minimise the
risk of interference with the peace process; the EU and U.S. should
appoint Special Envoys to demonstrate their commitment to the process
and provide adequate leverage with regional governments. 19. Develop
plans for short and long term support of the TFG, along the lines of the
Rapid Assistance Plan (RAP) and Recovery and Development Plan (RDP)
already under discussion. 20. Encourage the TFG and aid partners to
continue decentralised programming of resources until otherwise agreed.
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 December 2004 |
This work is in the public domain |
