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News :: Israel / Palestine |
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Introducing the Movement for One Democratic Secular State |
Current rating: 0 |
by John Sigler
(No verified email address) |
09 Aug 2004
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As the Israeli occupation continues to grow ever more entrenched, more and more people around the world are reaching the conclusion that the ethnic separatist "two-state solution" is no longer viable possibility. The level of physical integration between Palestinians and Israelis, both inside and outside the Green Line, as well as simple demographic realities has effectively negated any realistic separatist schemes aside from the current "ghettoization" policy being employed by the Israeli government, which is not sustainable. |
Introducing the Movement for One Democratic Secular State
As the Israeli occupation continues to grow ever more entrenched, more and more people around the world are reaching the conclusion that the ethnic separatist "two-state solution" is no longer viable possibility. The level of physical integration between Palestinians and Israelis, both inside and outside the Green Line, as well as simple demographic realities has effectively negated any realistic separatist schemes aside from the current "ghettoization" policy being employed by the Israeli government, which is not sustainable.
The alternatives to ethnic separation within Mandatory Palestine (“between the river and the sea”) are the "one state models", both racist one state models based on ethnically cleansing "the others" from Israel/Palestine and the progressive one state models based on integrating Palestinians - including the refugees - and Israelis into a single state and polity. For progressives, the idea of ethnic cleansing is utterly anathema and can therefore be ruled out as an acceptable solution.
Among the progressive one state models there is an extremely broad array of opinion on how this can best be brought about. The federalist model envisions separate ethnic states or cantons, and draws much of its inspiration from the examples of Belgium and Switzerland. The binational model envisions separate group-specific laws and rights within the framework of a united state, similar to the existing status quo in Israel proper or the situation in modern Lebanon, sans the overt discrimination against particular communities. The integrationist models hold the view that separate can never be equal and generally look to the South African model inspiration, based on core principles of anti-racism, "one person - one vote", and the nondiscriminatory employment of the rule of law to all citizens. Each of these models has its own advantages and disadvantages and it is impossible to say which model will eventually gain the most support.
Right now the one state perspective is a minority one. However, some 25-30% of Palestinian refugees, the vast majority of Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship, and smaller percentages of other Israelis and Palestinians already view the one state proposition as an acceptable compromise. All of these percentages can be increased if we, as in the global peace, justice, and human rights community take on the issue and make it mainstream.
In order to advance the progressive one state concept - regardless of the model preferred - we have decided to launch the "Movement for One Democratic Secular State" project. At this early stage we are primarily forming an online community in order to enable networking between one state activists, to share tips and opinions on effective one state advocacy, as well as to generally develop the progressive one state concept by allowing advocates of the various models to make their respective cases and then debate the issues. This is an essentially progressive project, meaning that we expect all participants to stay within the basic - though very broad - perimeters of the project as defined on the "Positions of the Movement" page. Further the community is fully democratic, each member has the right to propose new initiatives, vote on previous initiatives as well as to discuss various concerns in an open forum among other members.
The Movement is meant to accommodate both the intellectual as well as the activist, though you need not be either to participate. On the intellectual front there are the discussions regarding the various models as well as how to get from where we are today to actually realizing the one state ideal in Palestine/Israel. For the activist, we discuss ways and means of arguing the point, effective rebuttal of ethnocentric/racist positions, examples of other activities elsewhere that can be employed in your area, as well as a news service to advertise your own efforts at promoting the one state ideal.
Please visit the Movement for One Democratic Secular State website at http://www.onestate.org Read the "Positions" and "Purpose" of the Movement and if you find your own views compatible with ours, please consider joining us. In most respects, the one state case is much easier to make than the ethnic separatist "two-state solution" one, therefore it behooves us to encourage the one state case to become a mainstream suggestion. The initiative is new, having only went public on August 7, so there is plenty of room to for everyone to participate.
John Sigler
Movement for One Democratic Secular State
http://www.onestate.org |
See also:
http://www.onestate.org
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This work is in the public domain |
Comments
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Re: Introducing the Movement for One Democratic Secular State |
by gehrig
(No verified email address) |
Current rating: 0
10 Aug 2004
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Polls demonstrate that neither most Palestinians nor most Israelis want the two-cats-in-a-bag one-state solution. Which is why one-state organizations -- this one is hardly the first -- tend not to go anywhere.
It seems like the only argument the one-state position has is that the two-state solution, despite its overwhelming popularity over the one-state solution, is somehow inherently impossible.
The argument that the Israeli settlements near the Green Line make it impossible to separate the states is not credible. You'll recall that the Oslo talks offered the Palestinians between 1 and 3 percent of the land _west_ of the Green Line in exchange for Israeli sovereignty over the settlements closest to the Green Line. So much for _that_ impossibility.
The idea that an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank would automatically become a ghetto ignores two important considerations. One is that generous international funding -- of exactly the sort that accompanied Oslo -- would likely be offered again. The world knows that there's a lot at stake, especially with the rise of Islamist terrorism aimed at folks _besides_ the Israelis, and would be willing to financially contribute to a solution.
Another important reason why international relief funding to the Palestinians hasn't been more generous is the open secret that Yasir Arafat is getting rich off it -- last year "60 Minutes" estimated his personal fortune at two billion dollars, if you count all the various Palestinian national funds he maintains sole control over. Any peace settlement would surely include adequate safeguards to make sure the money intended for Palestinian infrastructure doesn't go to more diamonds for Sula.
To suggest that the two-state solution is inherently racist assumes that -- to use your intentionally tendentious and inappropriate phrase, the sort of thing that costs you credibility points if you do it too often -- "ethnic cleansing" will take place. Well, nobody's going to be throwing any Arabs out of the state of Israel, where they've been citizens since 1948. Israel doesn't want to be exclusively Jewish, but it does want to remain Jewish in character. Palestine, presumably, doesn't want to be exclusively Palestinian either. The only "ethnic cleansing" that's going to be going on is the evacuation of Jewish settlements. Whether it remains legal to be a Jew in Palestine after these evacuations will be up to the state of Palestine.
To argue that "separate can never be equal" is to argue against the nation state in general. As long as Germany and France remain separate states, then the Germans and the French can never be equal. Why is this "separate can never be equal" argument only brought up when it comes to Israel and Palestine?
There _is_ and has been longstanding support for the two-state solution among the Palestinians, the Israelis, the UN, American Jews, Arab Americans, the EU -- in fact, every constituency that has any say at all in the process.
And I'm curious why polls of the Palestinians expressing support for the one-state solution tend not to ask the all-important follow-up question: _why_ do you want a one-state solution? I'd expect that quite a few would answer that, given the sorry history of the Palestinian Authority, they'd prefer not to live under a PA government a second longer than necessary. Which means that the one-state solution is merely a substitute for the _real_ issue, which is the well-documented corruption of the PA.
The two-state solution is a difficult but achievable goal. The one-state "solution" is pie in the sky. My recommendation: don't chase rainbows and pixie dust, if you want anything to come of your efforts except frustration.
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Re: on the failure of Oslo |
by nytimes via gehrig
(No verified email address) |
Current rating: 0
10 Aug 2004
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The presumption that the two-state solution is impossible also fails to take into account the degree that the failure of Oslo was the result of one man's personality.
Here are some excerpts of a recent NYTimes review of a book by Dennis Ross, Clinton's chief negotiator.
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August 8, 2004
'The Missing Peace': Exhausted Are the Peacemakers
By ETHAN BRONNER
THE MISSING PEACE
The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace.
By Dennis Ross.
Illustrated. 840 pp. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. $35.
[...] Explaining the collapse of Middle East peace efforts of recent years is the focus of a small and growing library. But no one has the broad perspective of Dennis Ross, who began his service under the first George Bush and continued it through eight years of Clinton and several Israeli governments. For that reason alone, this is a work of historical significance.
To the question of what went wrong, Ross offers two answers, one simple and one messy but no less true or important. The simple answer is that in the end Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, was the principal cause of the failure. Ross illustrates this in numerous ways. The most important and dramatic is an account of late December 2000, when, with only a few weeks left in his administration, President Clinton suggested a set of guidelines to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli cabinet accepted the framework with several reservations that were within the guidelines laid out by the president. Arafat did not. Ross recounts watching Clinton tell Arafat that by not responding to the American ideas, ''he was killing Barak and the peace camp in Israel.'' Arafat did not budge. As Ross puts it: ''A comprehensive deal was not possible with Arafat. . . . He could live with a process, but not with a conclusion.''
The second explanation, the messier one, is that neither side had taken sufficient steps to grasp the needs and neuroses of the other. Ross says ''the Israelis acted as if all decisions should be informed by their needs, not by possible Palestinian needs or reactions.'' Regarding the Arabs, he writes, ''The kind of transformation that would make it possible for the Arab world to acknowledge that Israel has needs has yet to take place.'' As for the American role, Ross puts it this way: ''Our great failing was not in misreading Arafat. Our great failing was in not creating the earlier tests that would have either exposed Arafat's inability to ultimately make peace or forced him to prepare his people for compromise.''
[...]
Ross's analysis of the peace process is astute, but the real service he performs in this book is less in explaining the meaning of events than in setting the record straight. There has been much dispute over what was offered to the Palestinians in the 2000 Camp David meeting and in the months that followed. This book should end that discussion. The final deal, made orally to the Palestinians and Israelis by Clinton, is laid out in the appendix. Broadly, the ideas were these:
Territory: The Palestinians would get all of Gaza and between 94 and 96 percent of the West Bank. In exchange for what they would not get of the West Bank, Israel would be required to give up between 1 percent and 3 percent of its own land.
Security: Israel would withdraw from the West Bank over 36 months with an international force gradually introduced into the area. A small Israeli presence in fixed locations would remain in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the international force for another 36 months. Palestine would be defined as a ''nonmilitarized state'' with a strong internal security force and an international presence for border and deterrence purposes.
Jerusalem: What is Arab in the city would be Palestinian and what is Jewish Israeli. Palestinians would have sovereignty over the plaza of the mosques and Israelis over the Western Wall.
Refugees: Palestinian refugees would either move to the new state of Palestine, be rehabilitated in their host country, resettle in a third country or be admitted to Israel if Israel so chose. None would have the right to return to Israel against Israel's will.
One of the reasons there has been so little clarity regarding this offer is that it evolved over eight months. The first offer made by Israel to the Palestinians in preparation for the July 2000 Camp David summit was for nearly 60 percent of the West Bank. Over time it could grow to 80 percent. The Palestinians walked out, and the next offer was for 87 percent. At Camp David itself, the offer was for 91 percent plus a 1 percent swap. In other words, the Palestinians were right to say no with such consistency. The deal kept improving. What they did not know was when to say yes.
[...] There is also one exceptionally poignant and prescient moment near the book's end. It is Dec. 29, 2000, and Arafat still will not say yes. Ahmed Qurei, known as Abu Ala, a top Palestinian negotiator (later he became prime minister), has come to see Ross, who tells him the new president, George W. Bush, will want to have nothing to do with Arafat after Clinton's experience.
''Mark my words,'' Ross reports telling Abu Ala, ''they will disengage from the issue and . . . you will have Sharon as prime minister. He will be elected for sure if there is no deal, and your 97 percent will become 40 to 45 percent; your capital in East Jerusalem will be gone. . . .
''He looked at me sadly and with a note of complete resignation, replied, 'I am afraid it may take another 50 years to settle this now.' ''
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