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Commentary :: Israel / Palestine
APN on the Disengagement Plan: Good, Bad, Ugly	Current rating: 0
by APN via gehrig Email: zemblan (nospam) earthlink.net (verified)	20 Apr 2004

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 16, 2004 Israeli-U.S. Disengagement Plan: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Summary The recent meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and U.S. President George W. Bush regarding Sharons disengagement proposal resulted in an exchange of letters and public pronouncements that holds the potential for progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in that it could lead to the evacuation of all Israeli settlers from Gaza and four small West Bank settlements. But at the same time, it weakens the negotiating process and the role of the United States as an honest broker between the two sides. Only a credible effort from President Bush to hold Israel to its earlier, unfilled commitments regarding settlement outposts, a settlement freeze, and Palestinian human rights can begin to restore American credibility as an honest broker and legitimacy to Palestinian pragmatists, even though the president has mostly proven unwilling or unable to take such steps in the past. The Good The most positive aspect of the disengagement plan is that Prime Minister Sharonthe godfather of the settlement movementhas come to the conclusion that the Israeli settler presence in Gaza and parts of the West Bank harms Israeli security and economic interests. While he is merely playing catch up to the Israeli public and the international community, Sharon is setting an important precedent by at least rhetorically recognizing that settlers are a source of friction, not security, in some areas of the occupied territories, and must be removed. Sharon sees the evacuation of Gaza settlers as an acceptable trade-off for deepening the Israeli occupation of significant parts of the West Bank, and he is unlikely to make the kinds of concessions there in the future that are required to fulfill President Bushs call for a viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent Palestinian state. Nonetheless, he has used language and proposed steps that will make it easier for a better intentioned Israeli leader to more comprehensively address the settlement movement in the future. Although it would be preferable to have Israel negotiate its evacuation of Gaza with the Palestinians, any removal of settlers is a welcome development. President Bush, to his credit, has at least rhetorically held out the possibility of resuming negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, indicating that only such talks will lead to solutions to thorny final status issues, such as borders, settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem. Although President Bush was explicit in outlining American positions on the questions of borders, settlements, and Palestinian refugees, he did not stray too far substantively from positions and understandings that President Clinton outlined after bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as Track Two diplomatic efforts, like the Geneva initiative and the Nusseibeh/Ayalon principles. The presidents letter to Sharon discusses final borders between the two sides in a manner consistent with language in UN Resolution 242, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict, rather than calling for a pullout from ALL of the territories Israel captured in the Six Day War. Bushs letter is unspecific about what areas of the West Bank may remain in Israeli hands as a result of final status negotiations, and it could just as easily refer to the Jewish suburbs of Jerusalem as the major settlement blocs in the West Bank. His letters reference to new realities on the ground leading to new circumstances that must be taken into account could refer to Palestinian population growth as much as settlement growth. Ironically, the passage of his letter dealing with Palestinian refugees can be read in the same manner that Israel has long interpreted UN Resolution 242indicating that a solution in any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel. Nothing in the presidents letter says that ALL of the Palestinian refugees must settle in a new Palestinian state. The Bush/Sharon exchange correctly calls on the Palestinians to take steps against terrorism and to engage in fundamental political reform. It also calls for an international effort to help the Palestinians with political, economic, and security assistance in order to improve their lives in the occupied territories. The Bad Prime Minister Sharons letter includes statements that severely weaken the Road Map and were left unchallenged by President Bush. This development does not bode well for the Road Map as a viable negotiating vehicle. For example, Sharon references Israels acceptance of the Road Map, as adopted by our government, which approved a series of reservations that essentially gutted the diplomatic initiative. Sharon also talks about the Road Maps formula that sets forth the correct sequence and principles for the attainment of peace, a reference to Israels insistence on sequential implementation of the Road Mapwith the Palestinians going first with all of their obligations before Israel does anythingrather than the parallel implementation of obligations for which the Road Map calls in most instances. President Bushs letter says, the United States remains committed to my vision and to its implementation as described in the Road Map. The United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan. And yet, that is exactly what Prime Minister Sharons letter says he is doing with the disengagement effort. This initiative, Sharon wrote, which we are not undertaking under the Road Map, represents an independent Israeli plan, yet is not inconsistent with the Road Map. There appears to be a basic disagreement here about whether or not disengagement is, in fact, part of the Road Map. Finally, President Bush bought into Sharons excuse for not taking action against settlement outposts. The Road Map requires Israel to immediately dismantle settlement outposts erected since March 2001. Both the Sharon letter and Bushs statement refer to Israels responsibility to remove unauthorized outposts. The difference is important. The Israeli Peace Now movement has documented over 60 settlement outposts established since March 2001. However, after the Road Map was introduced, the Israeli Defense Ministry launched a campaign to find ways to retroactively authorize most of these outposts. As a result, President Bush is obligating Sharon to remove only a fraction of the new settlements that he would otherwise have to evacuate if the terms of the Road Map were being enforced. The Ugly The biggest problem with the Bush/Sharon exchange is the context of the statements that President Bush made. It is one thing for the president to reach conclusions about reasonable compromises that result from bilateral Israeli-Palestinian discussions. It is quite another for the president to unilaterally outline American positions on these issues. In stating the Administrations positions on borders, settlements, and refugees, President Bush severely weakened Americas ability to serve as an honest broker between Israel and the Palestinians in future peace talks. Palestinian leaders will have a strong disincentive to engage in serious negotiations hosted by the United States knowing that the president has already come out against their positions (regardless of the substantive arguments against them). Further, President Bush has delivered a gift-wrapped propaganda message to Palestinian extremists, who are already saying that the presidents positions on final status issues demonstrate that negotiations are not the way forward, that terrorism and force are the only things that Israel and the United States understand. In the context of Israels earlier willingness to compromise on Palestinian security prisoners with Hezbollah in a way that Israel was not willing to do with then-Prime Minister Abu Mazen, the Presidents message can be seen as a severe blow to the secular Palestinian nationalist moderates who were already having trouble getting political traction in their society. President Bushs statements empower Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, as well as extremists in other parts of the Arab world. Conclusion President Bush has two chances to try to help the Israeli evacuation of settlers from Gaza and the West Bank as a bridge to the negotiating process. First, the presidents statement mentions that the Government of Israel is committed to take additional steps on the West Bank, including progress toward a freeze on settlement activity, removing authorized outposts, and improving the humanitarian situation by easing the restrictions on the movement of Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities. The U.S. assumed responsibility to monitor Israeli compliance with these obligations under the Road Map, but largely failed to do so. Now, President Bush must be monitored closely to see how seriously he presses Prime Minister Sharon to live up to these commitments in order to show the Palestinians that there are benefits to disengagement. The U.S. must work intensely to hold Israel to its obligations, particularly when it comes to easing mobility for Palestinians between their communities (by removing roadblocks, lifting closures and changing the route of the security fence), ending collective punishment, and stopping home demolitions and assassinations. The U.S. will be asked to provide substantial financial aid to help Israel carry out its disengagement plan in the form of money to develop the Negev and Galilee areas. This request should be used as leverage with Israel to ensure its performance in these compliance areas. Second, as the Administration strives to reduce Palestinian terrorism, the president must also work to bring Palestinian moderates into the disengagement process. The U.S. has already learned that it is futile to call on Palestinian leaders to assert responsibility for events on the ground when the president has declared them to be irrelevant to the peace process. Unless there is some level of engagement between the U.S. and Palestinian moderates at this time, it will be equally futile for the president to call on them to work for political and economic reforms, assert security control in Gaza, and fight Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The lack of Palestinian involvement in implementation is a recipe for instability and chaos on the borders of Israel and Egyptsomething that is not in the interests of the United States and Arab moderates, and something that can only be averted through direct diplomatic engagement. Copyright © 2004 Americans for Peace Now We are a 501(c)(3) organization
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