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News :: Israel / Palestine |
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Israeli Report Criticizes Barak, Police |
Current rating: 0 |
by haaretz via gehrig
(No verified email address) |
01 Sep 2003
Modified: 06:39:01 PM |
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Or Commission report on October 2000 riots, in which 13 Israeli Arabs were killed, criticizes then-PM Barak, his public security minister, and police leadership; it also condemned Arab Israeli leaders for incendiary rhetoric. |
Or report: no sanctions on Barak, Ben-Ami failed in his job
By Yair Ettinger, Haaretz Correspondent
The Or Commission of inquiry into the Oct. 2000 riots published its
report Monday, severely criticizing then prime minister Ehud Barak and
then Public Security Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, as well as the top
echelons of the police.
The report, however, determined that Barak's actions at the time do not
prevent him from running again for the post of prime minister.
The report was less forgiving with regard to Ben-Ami, determining that
he failed in his post and cannot again serve as Minister of Public
Security.
The three-man panel - Justice Theodor Or, Judge Hashim Khatib and Prof.
Shimon Shamir - set up to investigate the deaths of 13 Arabs in clashes
with police that lasted several days, also criticized some of the
statements by two Arab Knesset members, but did not recommend sanctions
against them.
One Jew was also killed during the rioting.
Justice Minister Yosef Lapid told Channel One TV that the Or Commission
report "was just the beginning," and that all the deaths needed to be
investigated, a process he said could take several years.
In an interview on Channel Two TV, Public Security Minister Tzachi
Hanegbi said that he would ask Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for the
government to discuss the report soon and to adopt its findings in their
entirety.
Former prime minister Ehud Barak The report concludes that Barak was not
sufficiently aware of what was going on in the Arab sector, even though
there was serious concern during his term in office that widespread
rioting might break out in the Arab sector.
The report holds Barak responsible for failing to convene deliberations
on the issue. The charge refers to National Security Council reports
that warned about the situation in the Arab sector before the rioting
began.
The report also charges Barak with failing to take sufficient steps to
prevent police from using deadly force in the first two days of the
riots, but the commission withdrew its earlier accusation that Barak did
not pay enough attention to the riots and "didn't do enough to bring
about calm" by meeting with Arab leaders.
He is also criticized for "not fulfilling his obligation" as prime
minister because he did not ask police to prepare a report on incidents
in which civilians were killed or seriously wounded.
At the same time, the report did not find evidence that, prior to
October 2, 2000, Barak issued an order for the roads to be opened "at
all costs," even if it would endanger human life. In the course of the
riots, Arab protestors blocked the roads in the north.
The report found that Barak instructed security forces to "demonstrate
resolve" in keeping traffic routes open and concluded that "this was not
an unreasonable directive."
Former Public Security Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami
With regard to Ben-Ami, the panel recommended that he not serve again as
Public Security Minister due to his "significant failure" in performing
his job. According to the report, Ben-Ami failed to prepare the police
for the wide-scale riots in the Arab sector, even though he was aware of
the processes that made the events likely.
Ben-Ami also "failed to exhibit sufficient vigilance" with regard to the
dangers involving the use of rubber-coated bullets for dispersing
demonstrations, and did not make sure the police forces were properly
deployed in the areas where the clashed were taking place.
According to the report, the minister "did not act firmly and resolutely
enough in supervising the police actions, as is required by his position
and the severity of the event."
The panel said it did not find any substantiation for the claim that
Ben-Ami was party to the order to keep roads that had been blocked open
"at any cost."
The report says that the commission took into consideration the fact
that Ben-Ami no longer holds public office and that his "intentions and
actions regarding police activity in the Arab sector were to a large
extent positive."
MKs Azmi Bishara and Abulmalik Dehamshe The report did not recommend
sanctions against Balad MK Azmi Bishara and United Arab List MK
Abdulmalik Dehamshe. The commission found, however, that they were both
responsible, shortly before the riots, for passing on a message "that
supported violence as a way to achieve the objectives of the Arab
sector," and that they thereby "contributed significantly to inflaming
the atmosphere and making the violence more severe."
Islamic Movement leader Raad Salah
The commission does not recommend any action be taken against Sheikh
Raad Salah, the leader of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement
and former mayor of Umm al Fahm. However, the committee found that
Salah, who was arrested earlier this year and is facing charges, not
related to the riots, of channeling funds to Hamas-affiliated groups,
"significantly contributed to inflaming the atmosphere and to the
violent outburst" in the Arab sector.
The report said that in the two years prior to the violent events he was
responsible for "relaying recurring messages encouraging the use of
violence and the threat of violence as a means for achieving the goals
of the Arab sector in the state of Israel."
He held mass gatherings and "used fiery propaganda methods to create an
inflamed public atmosphere around the sensitive subject of the Al Aqsa
Mosque."
In his statements, the report said, Salah relayed "messages that negated
the legitimacy of the existence of the state of Israel, and presented
the state as an enemy."
Former police chief Yehuda Wilk
The panel found that Yehuda Wilk, who was police commissioner at the
time of the riots, exhibited a "fundamental failure in his role", and
was responsible for "breaching" the trust the political echelon placed
in him.
As a result, the report recommends that Wilk not be allowed to serve
again in a senior security position. Wilk was found responsible for not
having sufficiently trained and equipped the police to deal with the
riots, and for not reacting effectively when they began.
Former northern commander Alik Ron
The commission also blocks former commander of the northern command,
Major General Alik Ron, from serving in a senior public security post.
It charges him with allowing the use of live fire without notifying the
political leadership.
Superintendent Guy Reif
As for Superintendent Guy Reif, the commission recommends that he be
removed from police service and concludes that he is unfit for an
officer position with the force.
The only exception to the list of accusations confirmed is northern
command intelligence officer Yaron Meir, on whom no responsibility is
placed.
Sub-District Commander Moshe Waldman
The Or report finds Sub-District Commander Brig. Gen. Moshe Waldman
responsible for sharpshooters' firing without justification and in
violation of police regulations. In his role as regional commander
during the riots, Waldman did not adequately investigate or exercise
control over the use of rubber-coated bullets, and allowed its frequent,
without justification, despite knowing of the high risk and potential
for fatalities. Furthermore, in overseeing the dispersion of
demonstrators, Waldman failed to give priority to less physically and
psychologically dangerous means of crowd control.
Moreever, the report finds that on October 8, 2000, Waldman issued
orders to use live fire without adequately showing the presence of a
risk justifying the use of live fire against civilians. As a result of
these orders, many citizens were wounded and at least one was killed. In
retrospect, however, conditions justifying the use of rubber-coated
bullets were not even present.
After the incident, Waldman failed to order an external probe, as was
his duty, the report says. Instead, he was personally responsible for
the investigation of the incident he had been commanding himself – an
explicit conflict of interest. Later, Commander Waldman failed to see to
the timely publication of the investigation finsings, especially those
involving live fire, rubber bullets, and injuries. Finally, the report
shows that Waldman did not see to the maintenance of adequate written
records of the events.
Notwithstanding the Or commission's impression that Waldman is a serious
and experienced commander, these violations committed while in the line
of duty and ethical infringements are such that it recommends that he
dismissed from police service.
The police
The report severely criticizes the police, saying many officers relate
to Israeli Arabs as an enemy element. The report also said that the
police lacks a "culture of reporting and full and true investigation
when necessary" (including in the upper echelons of the force). The
report also said the police lacked a culture of learning from past
experience.
The report recommended that police limit their use of rubber-coated
bullets, and noted that "the police are not viewed in the Arab sector as
a group that provides services but as a hostile group that serves a
hostile regime."
Equality between Jewish and Arab sectors
In its report, the commission asks the government to place the promotion
and integration of the Arab sector at the forefront of its agenda. It
stresses the urgency of achieving real equality of rights between the
Jewish and Arab sectors, especially in land claims, and recommends that
the prime pinister take on the issue himself.
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Comments
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Re: Haaretz Editorial Condemning Final Report As Toothless |
by haaretz via gehrig
(No verified email address) |
Current rating: 0
02 Sep 2003
|
Haaretz editorial on the Or Commission report:
A grave report, tepid conclusions
The Or Commission's report, published yesterday, defines Israel's treatment of its Arab population as "the most important and sensitive domestic matter on the state's agenda." In light of this diagnosis, it was disappointing to discover that the commission became trapped in a contradiction between its findings and its recommendations.
The picture the commission paints is extraordinarily worrisome: a consistent policy, by all Israeli governments, of discriminating against the Arab sector; growing extremism among the Arab population and irresponsible behavior by its leaders, who have led significant portions of this public to aspire to separate from the state; an organizational and managerial culture in the police that recalls the worst days of the Israel Defense Forces in the early 1950s.
Yet the commission's conclusions are tepid and lack teeth. It does not recommend holding Ehud Barak to account for his flawed performance as prime minister; with regard to Shlomo Ben-Ami, it confines itself to recommending that he not be allowed to serve as public security minister again; it does not propose any sanctions against the Arab MKs; it advises closing the doors of the police to several senior officers, such as former commissioner Yehuda Wilk, who have in any case already left the force, and recommends that other officers be barred from promotion for limited periods. The only officer it calls for dismissing is the commander of the Amakim District, Commander Moshe Waldman.
The gap between the Or Commission's grave factual findings and its practical conclusions stems, among other things, from the gap between its ambition to present a complete picture of the events that led up to the October 2000 riots and the judicial criteria with which it examined the responsibility of the people involved. In accordance with this approach, the political echelon is accused of a shameful failure for not foreseeing and forestalling an ill that stemmed from many years of simmering resentment in the Arab sector, but no sanctions are imposed on these politicians on the grounds that this is a matter for the public to decide. In the same spirit, the commission found that senior politicians gave the police a "green light" to use any means to open the Wadi Ara road, but since it could not prove that they ordered the police to do so "at any cost" (including via the use of live fire), it exempts them from responsibility in this area.
The result is a report that does as little damage as possible to the responsible parties: The government and the leaders of the Arab sector received mere rhetorical rebukes; the responsibility for determining the circumstances surrounding the deaths of each of the 13 Arabs killed was transferred to the Justice Ministry's department for investigating policemen; the recommendations for a change of policy toward the Arab sector were addressed to the government merely as a plea. Only the police were subjected to practical demands for a comprehensive reform, including of its approach to the Arab public and its preparedness for stormy mass demonstrations - obvious demands in light of its embarrassing performance, as described by the commission.
This does not mean the commission's work has no value. Its findings are extremely important, and its effectiveness as a means of defusing pressure and anger has been proven anew. Nevertheless, the report's practical impact will be measured by the translation of its recommendations into practice. If the government ignores them, relations between Israel's majority and its minority are liable to reach a boiling point from which there will be no return.
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