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Europe Failed Temporarily in Iran |
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by Georg Schofbanker
Email: mbatko (nospam) lycos.com (verified) |
27 Feb 2006
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Iran will need at least 3 to 5 years for producing highly enriched uranium for its first bombs and much longer o produce the necessary centrifuges..Whoever threatens with a preventive attack should not be surprised about proliferation. |
EUROPE FAILED TEMPORARILY IN IRAN
Can a New War be prevented? Moscow holds the Key. A Pessimistic Prognosis
By Georg Schofbanker
[This article published in the German-English cyber journal Telepolis, 2/21/2006 is translated from the German on the World Wide Web, http://www.telepolis.de/r4/artikel/22/22084/1.html. Georg Schofbanker is a political scientist and directs the Austrian information center for security policy and arms control in Linz.]
People in Europe are very nervous. The probes of the US government on NATO participation and fly-over rights over Turkey for a military operation against Iran publicized at the end of December 2005 were more than foreign policy pressures from the US. The likelihood of a military “answer” to the Iranian nuclear question increased considerably with transfer to the US Security Council and the subsequent reports of the IAEA [Bombs on Iran? (1)].
For years, Iran pursued a strategy of creating the technical prerequisites for nuclear weapons. Egypt and Saudi Arabia could be impacted by this strategy. Nuclear weapons existed in Pakistan at least since the 1998 tests. But Pakistan as a US ally was never seriously under US pressure although Pakistan’s support for the Taliban was known for a long time and part of the territory is regarded as ungovernable.
The cat-and-mouse game of the IAEA over prohibited military nuclear programs and the “legitimate peaceful” use of nuclear energy have dragged along since 2003. The soup is substantially thicker in the case of Iran than in the case of Iraq although Iran will need at least 3 to 5 years for producing highly enriched uranium for its first bombs and much longer if producing the necessary centrifuges is resumed. The production of weapon-grade uranium is not primary but rather enough centrifuges. For the plant in Natanz, 50,000 centrifuges are earmarked. At present, Iran has only barely 1,000 centrifuges.
Other technical problems are also considerable like the manufacture of UF6. The resumption of pilot enrichment in the Natanz facility is a step in this direction but is far from developing Iran’s nuclear weapons. The production of a simple nuclear weapon on the basis of Chinese construction manuals from the 1960s and adaptation of warheads for Iranian missiles would face massive scientific and technical obstacles.
NEGOTIATION OPTIONS WITH IRAN
Secret services and governments see realities very differently. In Israel, the “point of no return” was long proclaimed while its own “military solution” was held out.
Given this reality, the past failure of the European Union (EU) is terrible but need not be the last word. Whoever negotiates must be open for sanctions and concessions. For a long while, the EU-3 was not open for these possibilities whether because of folly, unimaginativeness or a previously harmonized strategy with the US.
Negotiation possibilities still exist for the EU-3 if they have something to offer. The Iranian position emphasized two important points – if one fades out the Iranian divergences and power struggles.
Firstly, certainty of its electricity supply was naively and negligently conceived on a nuclear basis as in the nuclear-euphoric 1960s of western industrial states. If this position is taken seriously, the EU must help open up natural gas reserves and regenerative sources of energy in Iran. Secondly, Iranian policy always involved security guarantees in relation to potential attackers and reacted to Israel’s security guarantees as the regional nuclear hegemon and the US. European negotiations failed. Ahmadinedschad’s threats of destroying Israel and his holocaust denials are part of a global smear campaign and at the same time a naïve-helpless denial of reality [A Question of Good and Evil, God and the Devil (2)]. The intolerable arrogance of the Iranian regime only plays into the hands of hardliners in Israel and the US.
INTEREST IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE HAS RISEN WORLDWIDE
Seen systemically, wanting to acquire nuclear weapons is not merely a strange request of the Iranian regime. Whoever takes seriously the changed significance of nuclear weapons since 9/11 must recognize the effect of the new US military doctrine accelerating proliferation. Whoever threatens with a preventive attack – for whatever reason – should not be surprised that interest in nuclear deterrence increases worldwide. Paul Pillar (3), a CIA dissident and analyst, emphasized this point.
If Iraq had possessed a credible nuclear deterrent, an attack on its regime would have been much less likely. First and foremost, US doctrine explicitly accepted a potential first nuclear strike of nuclear weapons against “unfriendly proliferators.” This was made known at he end of 2005 by the strategic supreme command of the US armed forces. In addition to the old familiar deterrence, there is now an offensive global plan called CONPLAN 8022 (4) that also includes a nuclear component.
MILITARY PLANS ARE FAR ADVANCED
As with Chirac’s remarks [Chirac: Flex the nuclear muscles (5)], one may speculate how seriously this is meant. US military doctrines are discussed in Teheran, Riad and Cairo. With these premises, the non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons is in its final stages. In this environment, a state without any security guarantees refuses all inhibitions to get nuclear weapons.
As a result, a possible air attack against Iran has moved closer. His will presumably be an offensive war of the US. An authorization by the Security Council is hardly conceivable on account of the economic and strategic interests of Russia and China. The US will turn against an inferior enemy. What is involved is a “decapitation strike” against the religious, political and military elites, not only a military operation against the nuclear facilities of Iran. A regime change will be attempted with the support of opposition groups.
While this is probably not decided yet in Washington, the military plans are far advanced. An attack without ground troops would be politically easy to carry out. The offensive plan includes at least 400 targets; a first strike of sub-strategic nuclear weapons is not entirely excluded but is earmarked as an escalation step.
A bloody chaos on the ground prevails four years after the Afghanistan intervention of the US and three years after the Iraq intervention of the US. Iran will not be different. In this case, massive terrorist strikes by Iranian actors in the states of the war coalition must be expected. This kind of conflict will hardly be limited and could easily lead to an extensive fire. The geo-political position of Iran is clearly more complex and more robust than the positions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
DOES EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY STILL HAVE A CHANCE?
Gaining time and de-escalating are vital. A beginning is imperative. The IAEA should remain in Iran. A withdrawal of the IAEA would harm Iran, the EU and the rest of the world. IAEA’s withdrawal would only benefit agitators. As a concession, a security guarantee for Iran must be worked out to move Teheran to abandon its military nuclear program.
The next steps of the US will show its resolved course. The last months before the Iraq invasion in March 2003 were marked by a global media mobilization for this war and by assertions about the non-existent Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. If we should witness the same by US policymakers, we can assume that the decision to attack Iran was already made.
[The numbers in parentheses refer to citations in the original German text in Telepolis] |
See also:
http://www.mbtranslations.com
http://www.antiwar.com
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